This paper studies how the internal organization of firms interacts with labor and product markets. I analyze millions of task assignments across hundreds of salons using data from a software company.

Consumer reviews do not reflect absolute product quality but rather quality relative to the price. We analyze a reputation model with a privately informed monopolist repeatedly selling its product to uninformed but rational consumers, who learn about product quality through past reviews and the current price.

We develop a model in which a principal delegates sequential search over uncertain objects to an agent. We use the model to analyze how recruiters influence the search for talent. During search, the recruiter does not learn worker productivity but only forms a belief characterized by an expectation and a variance.

In this paper, I study how voluntary labor supply decisions within an organization impact workplace injury using novel data on the payroll and workers’ compensation claims of Los Angeles traffic officers.

In this paper we demonstrate tips are sensitive to service quality even when future interaction is unlikely. Using a novel data set covering 150,000 hair salon appointments where customers can be observed over time, we are able to exploit variation in service quality and exogenous separation rates.