

# Jacob Kohlhepp

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## Education

P.h.D. Economics, UCLA (Expected June 2023)

M.A. Economics, UCLA (June 2020)

B.A. Economics, UCLA (June 2016)

B.A. Political Science, UCLA (June 2016)

## Research Fields:

Labor and Personnel Economics

Applied Theory

## Research

### *Working Papers*

#### **"Selection Against Injury Risk: Labor Supply Decisions of Los Angeles Traffic Officers"**

(with Michael Ludwig)

*Abstract:* Using 219,000 workers' compensation claims and pay records across 540 Los Angeles traffic officers, we examine whether individuals account for injury risk when making daily labor supply decisions. We use variation in the leave of coworkers as an instrument inducing officers to work. We find there is significant positive selection: on average, an officer at the 60th percentile of willingness to work is on average 104 percent more likely to be injured than an officer at the 80th percentile. Using variation in hourly wages, we also calculate the marginal value of injury risk, defined as the value of a 1 percentage point reduction in injury probability for officers that are indifferent between working and staying home. A 1 percentage point decrease in injury risk is valued on average between \$31 and \$67 in earnings. Using our model, we simulate the benefits of switching to a shift-auction mechanism of shift assignment. We find that shift auctions more fully leverage officer's natural tendency to select against risk, and as a result reduce the injury rate by 38 percent compared to a random list mechanism.

#### **"Who Gets the Job: A Model of Delegated Recruitment with Multidimensional Applicants"**

*Abstract:* In this paper, I construct a theoretical model of delegated recruitment. In the model, applicants are multidimensional, differing in both expected ability and what I term "hire risk." When the space of contracts is limited to the bonus contract commonly observed in the recruitment industry, the pool of applicants exhibits lower hire risk than the first-best benchmark. This implies recruiters pass-over high risk high reward applicants in favor of low risk, low-reward applicants. In a parametric implementation of the model, search efficiency and search intensity increase as the negative correlation between expected ability and hire risk increases.

*Works in Progress***Mechanisms for Assigning Volunteers to Tasks without Monetary Transfers****The Impact of Federal Seizures on Business Formation** (with Amy Mahler, USC)**Tipping Behavior in Hairstylist Relational Contracts***Other Projects***"Response Time Improvement from a New Rescue"**Available online: [www.intrepidinsight.com](http://www.intrepidinsight.com)

This is a pro bono analysis conducted for Culver City Fire Department. Using geo-coded call and response time data, I build a quantile regression model of unit-call response times. I then use the model to estimate that over 584 calls would have seen response time improvements of more than 3 minutes if the department had an additional rescue. The analysis was used to support the purchase of a new rescue-ambulance for the department.

**Efficient Volunteer Matching Applet using Modified TTC**Available for use as an online applet: [intrepidinsight.com/efficient-volunteer-matching-applet/](http://intrepidinsight.com/efficient-volunteer-matching-applet/)

The applet allows the user to upload a .csv containing volunteer preferences over jobs/tasks. The app then matches volunteers to tasks using a modified version of the Top-Trading Cycle algorithm. The applet is built using RShiny.

**Teaching****Teaching Assistant**Intermediate Microeconomics (Econ 11) Fall 2019Organizational Economics (Econ 106I) Winter 2020PhD Microeconomics: Asymmetric Information (Econ 201C) Spring 2020**Economics Tutor** 2018 - Present**Professional Experience****Anderson School of Business** June 2020 - Present

Research Associate for Dr. Melanie Wasserman, for project titled "Informed Choices: Gender Gaps in Career Advice."

Developed K-L divergence and sentiment metrics for comparing text responses in an experiment.

**Welch Consulting** 2016 - 2018

Associate economist. Specialized in pay equity, wrongful termination and damage calculation.

## Honors and Awards

Graduate Research Mentorship Recipient	2020 - 2021
Humane Studies Fellowship	2020 - 2021
Remote Learning TA Award	July 2020
Hayek Fund for Scholars	Feb. 2020
UCLA PhD First-Year Fellowship Recipient	2018 - 2019
Microeconomic Theory Qualifying Exam Pass with Honors	Summer 2019
UCLA Economics Award for Academic Excellence (Top 20-30 Graduates)	June 2016
UCLA Alumni Scholarship State Finalist	2012 - 2016
Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation Scholar	2012
Eagle Scout	

## Presentations

Los Angeles Conference in Applied Economics (USC)	Fall 2019
Institute for Humane Studies Graduate Workshop (Crystal City, VA)	Fall 2019

## Service/Leadership

<b>Founder and CEO of Intrepid Insight</b>	2018 - Present
Intrepid Insight is a volunteer organization dedicated to solving consulting problems for nonprofits and local governments and writing an educational blog along the way. Website available here: <a href="http://intrepidinsight.com">intrepidinsight.com</a>	
<b>Organizer of the UCLA Theory Proseminar</b>	2020 - Present
<b>President of the UCLA Alumni Scholars Club</b>	2015 - 2016
<b>Director of the UCLA Alumni Mentor Program</b>	2014 - 2015

## Programming Skills

Advanced Knowledge: R (Markdown, RShiny), STATA, LaTeX  
 Working Ability: Matlab, Visual Basic